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I. INTRODUCTION
“A judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity,
and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety.”1
This article examines Pennsylvania’s present judicial selection
method and two proposed amendments to Pennsylvania’s Constitu-
tion that would change the method of selecting the state’s appellate
judiciary.2 These two changes to appellate judicial selection and
their impact on judicial legitimacy are explored against the back-
drop of existing scholarly work and a recent controversial decision
from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The issues that arise
surrounding judicial selection methods are not new to legal schol-
arship.3 In fact, the best method of judicial selection has been dis-
cussed since the first, independent, state court systems were estab-
lished in the United States.4 Pennsylvania’s position in this ongo-
ing conversation is unique due to the length of time that Pennsyl-
vania’s appellate judiciary has existed and the various selection
methods that have been adopted and disavowed.5
Even where the selection process is not specifically at issue, legit-
imacy issues can arise regarding perceived un-judicial behavior,
and those perceptions can trigger renewed discussions about chang-
ing a state’s method of judicial selection.6 In Pennsylvania, the cur-
rent renewal of such discussion is especially noticeable because the
public’s perception has been impacted by a recent, controversial
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision.7
1. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
2. See H.R. 111, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019) (House Bill 111); H.R. 196,
2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019) (House Bill 196).
3. See, e.g., Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Judicial Nominating Commissions: Inde-
pendence, Accountability, and Public Support, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 73, 74 75 (2007); J.
Christopher Heagarty, Selection of State Appellate Judges: Judicial Campaigns and Voters’
Experience: Public Opinion and an Elected Judiciary: New Avenues for Reform, 39
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1287, 1288 (2003); Diane M. Johnsen, Building a Bench: A Close Look
at State Appellate Courts Constructed by the Respective Methods of Judicial Selection, 53 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 829, 832–33 (2016); Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is
There One “Best” Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 38 (1995).
4. See Heagarty, supra note 3, at 1288.
5. Sandra Schultz Newman & Daniel Mark Isaacs, Historical Overview of the Judicial
Selection Process in the United States: Is the Electoral System in Pennsylvania Unjustified?,
49 VILL. L. REV. 1, 6 7 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (triggering renewed discus-
sion regarding political speech of judges); League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 175
A.3d 282 (Pa. 2018) (concerning unconstitutional gerrymandering and reinvigorating conver-
sations about judges’ political motivation).
7. See League of Women Voters, 175 A.3d 282; Mike Folmer, Judicial Activism by Pa.
Supreme Court on New Congressional Maps, YORK DAILY REC. (Feb. 26, 2018, 11:26 AM),
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Although many judges and Justices have “strong political connec-
tions,” there is generally an expectation that the judiciary be inde-
pendent and fair.8 These qualities create a reputation of legitimacy
and are not typically expected of the more political branches of our
government.9 Where a judicial decision contradicts the public per-
ception of legitimacy, there is a response.10 This response can come
in the form of public outcry in the media, as well as through legis-
lative action.11
This article will address the public’s recent outcry following a con-
troversial 2018 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision and Pennsyl-
vania’s legislative response; both of which, unfortunately, appear to
indicate a lack of faith in the judiciary.12 Part II articulates the
history of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania. Part II.A
then explains the current method of appellate judicial selection:
state-wide partisan elections. Parts II.B and II.C next examine two
proposed amendments to the state Constitution that are currently
dueling to become the new method by which Pennsylvania selects
its appellate judiciary. Part III of this article proposes four factors,
based on guidance from both judicial opinions and scholarly arti-
cles, that, if met, should foster the public’s perception of legitimacy
for the bench. Part III continues on to test the impact of the pro-
posed amendments through the lenses of these four factors to de-
termine whether the amendments would generate more or less faith
in the judiciary.
https://www.ydr.com/story/opinion/columnists/2018/02/26/judicial-activism-pa-supreme-cou
rt-new-congressional-maps/373036002; Paul Muschick, Pennsylvania Gerrymandering Case
Shows Need for Merit Selection of Appellate Judges, THEMORNINGCALL (Feb. 21, 2018, 8:00
AM), https://www.mcall.com/opinion/mc-opi-pa-gerrymandering-supreme-court-merit-selec-
tion-muschick-20180220-story.html.
8. Raymond J. McKoski, The Political Activities of Judges: Historical, Constitutional,
and Self-Preservation Perspectives, 80 U. PITT. L. REV. 245, 298 (2018) (“Judges are experts
in politics. Many have a history of political activity before assuming the bench and many
have ‘strong political connections.’ . . . The reality is that judges are frequently politically
inclined.”).
9. SeeNeal Devins & Nicole Mansker, The Judiciary and the Popular Will: Public Opin-
ion and State Supreme Courts, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 456 (2010); Johnsen, supra note 3,
at 831.
10. See, e.g., Merit Selection System, PENNSYLVANIANS FORMOD. CTS., https://www.pmc
online.org/merit-selection-reform.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2019); Mary Beth Schluckebier,
We Should Keep Partisan Politics Out of Pennsylvania’s Judicial Elections, WHYY (Nov. 7,
2017), https://whyy.org/articles/keep-partisan-politics-pennsylvanias-judicial-selection/.
11. SeeMuschick, supra note 7; Schluckebier, supra note 10.
12. See League of Women Voters, 175 A.3d 282; Folmer, supra note 7; Marc Levy, GOP
Eyes Shakeup of Pennsylvania’s Democratic-Majority Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (Jan.
18, 2020), https://apnews.com/0fc8dbdf1f455e7d457ab6d2c5ce413d.
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II. BACKGROUND
Pennsylvania has experienced variations of both appointed and
elected appellate judiciary methods.13 Since 1968, Pennsylvania
follows a partisan election selection method, with a “yes/no” reten-
tion election.14 However, Pennsylvania’s judiciary has taken sev-
eral decades to reach its current selection method.15 About three
centuries ago, in 1722, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was es-
tablished by the Judiciary Act.16 The creation of the Supreme
Court, along with the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia,
Bucks, and Chester Counties, set the stage for the later creation of
Pennsylvania’s Unified Judicial System.17 In 1895, the General As-
sembly established the Superior Court.18 The initial purpose of the
Superior Court was to ease the workload of the Supreme Court and
establish statewide judicial districts.19 In 1968, nearly 250 years
after the initial establishment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia, the state Constitution was amended to create the Common-
wealth Court and reorganize the state’s lower court system.20 This
amendment established Pennsylvania’s Unified Judicial System as
we know it today.21 Since its establishment, Pennsylvania’s judicial
structure—specifically the process by which judges and Justices be-
come a part of that structure—has become the topic of substantial
scholarly discussion.22 But, conversations focused on politics in the
selection of a state’s appellate judiciary and concerns regarding ju-
dicial legitimacy are by no means exclusive to Pennsylvania.23
Before analyzing Pennsylvania’s current selection method or any
proposed changes to this method, one must understand how the
various selection methods that may be adopted function in practice.
13. Newman & Isaacs, supra note 5, at 6–8; see also Judicial Selection in Pennsylvania,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_selection_in_Pennsylvania (last visited Nov.
2, 2019).
14. Judicial Selection in Pennsylvania, supra note 13; Newman & Isaacs, supra note 5,
at 8 9.








22. See, e.g., Newman & Isaacs, supra note 5.
23. See, e.g., Legislative Assaults on State Courts – 2019, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan.
24, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/legislative-assaults-sta
te-courts-2019; Kevin Townsend, A Supreme Court Impeachment Fight That’s Already Under
Way, ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/im-
peachment-west-virginias-supreme-court/574495/.
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There are two general selection methods: appointment and elec-
tion.24 Each have their own sub-methods for selection.25 Addition-
ally, unless the judge or Justice is serving a life tenure, a method of
re-selection must be chosen.26 The pros and cons of both initial se-
lection and re-selection methods have been highly discussed;27 the
following is a brief summary of these methods.
First, an appellate judicial election may be partisan or non-parti-
san.28 Pennsylvania currently follows a partisan election process.29
In a partisan election system, judicial candidates run under a party
label;30 in a non-partisan selection system, candidates place their
names on a ballot without any party label.31 In both of these sys-
tems, as is the case with most election processes, campaign finance
can become an issue.32 In Pennsylvania specifically, concern and
even litigation have stemmed from the appearance of impropriety;
notably where, after a judge is elected, an entity, who previously
contributed financially to a judicial campaign, becomes involved in
a case before that judge.33 The appearance of impropriety that may
arise from campaign contributions also exists where an elected
judge or Justice has previously held a position of authority, such as
District Attorney, which later impacts their ability to decide the
case before them.34 Issues may also arise where the public perceives
that elected judges and Justices make judicial decisions to satisfy
the public that elected them or those who contributed to the judge
or Justices’ campaign.35
24. Judicial Selection in the States, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_selec-
tion_in_the_states (last visited Feb. 10, 2020).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Devins & Mansker, supra note 9, at 462. See generally Johnsen, supra note 3.
28. Judicial Selection in the States, supra note 24.
29. PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(a) (amended 1979).
30. Devins & Mansker, supra note 9, at 462.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 467 68; see also Ann A. Scott Timmer, The Influence of Re-Selection on Inde-
pendent Decision Making in State Supreme Courts, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 27, 44 (2019).
33. See Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 254 (3d Cir. 2013); see
also Devins & Mansker, supra note 9, at 495 (alterations in original) (quoting Justice Ken-
nedy’s explanation that “[w]e weren’t talking about [money in judicial elections] [thirty] years
ago because we didn’t have money in [judicial] elections. Money in elections presents us with
a tremendous challenge . . . .”); Merit Selection System, supra note 10 (importantly, the
homepage of this site sports the slogan “Merit not Money”).
34. See, e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (addressing the appear-
ance of impropriety requiring recusal where a state supreme court Justice was, in a previous
capacity, involved in administering death penalty orders that were later on appeal before
that Justice).
35. See Johnsen, supra note 3, at 837 (explaining that a judge or Justice can be tarnished
by even the perception that they “may be influenced by campaign donors who helped put
them on the bench”); see also Timmer, supra note 32, at 44.
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Under the umbrella of appointment, there are essentially two
methods by which a state’s appellate judge or Justice is appointed.36
A judge may be appointed by a gubernatorial (legislative) appoint-
ment process or under a merit plan.37 Under a gubernatorial ap-
pointment system, “the governor or legislature selects the [judge or]
justice . . . .”38 Under a merit-based system, a judge or Justice is
appointed based on consideration and recommendation by a board
or committee.39 Because of this process, enlisting an independent
committee or commission to select judicial candidates, some believe
merit selection systems provide a shield from financial or political
influence.40 Once selected, the judge generally faces a retention
election in which there are no other candidates; rather, voters are
asked whether they wish to retain that judge.41 Appointment sys-
tems, however, raise their own issues regarding potential pressure
placed on a judge to remain loyal to the appointing entity rather
than to the people, the law, or their independent beliefs when mak-
ing influential decisions.42
Additionally, although this article will not specifically analyze
the impact of re-selection method, re-selection has been explored as
a potential solution to calm public discontent with the judiciary.43
When it comes to re-selection, there may be a partisan election, non-
partisan election, retention election, appointment, or term of ser-
vice for life or until mandatory retirement age44—though the latter
is only used by a notable minority of states.45 The methods em-
ployed for retention or selection of the judiciary vary vastly from
state to state and even between different levels of courts within one
36. Judicial Selection in the States, supra note 24.
37. Id.
38. Devins & Mansker, supra note 9, at 462.
39. Id.
40. Johnsen, supra note 3, at 837.
41. Id.
42. See Johnsen, supra note 3, at 840 (articulating potential disadvantages to diverse
groups and concern “that merit selection tends to reinforce elitist, majoritarian, and estab-
lishment decision-making”); Timmer, supra note 32, at 29 (explaining the shifts in public
perception including the theory that an elected judiciary “derive[] their authority from the
people would be more independent-minded than hand-picked friends of governors or jurists
subject to the beck and call of the legislature”); Id. at 45 (drawing attention to the behind the
scenes politics involved in appointment process and including a state Justice’s own observa-
tion that “[t]here are more politics in the appointment process”); Schluckebier, supra note 10,
(noting that merit selection would not eliminate politics but it would move them out of the
public’s direct attention).
43. See generally Stefanie A. Lindquist, Judicial Activism in State Supreme Courts: In-
stitutional Design and Judicial Behavior, 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61 (2017) (discussing the
impact of retention method on judicial behavior and the potential repercussions on public
perception of the legitimacy of the judiciary).
44. Id. at 72 73.
45. Id. at 73.
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state. However, each method of selection or retention shares the
same goal: to produce legitimacy on the bench and faith in the judi-
ciary. In this way, each method addresses certain goals for the ju-
diciary that are important not only in Pennsylvania, but also na-
tionally.46
A. Pennsylvania’s Current Judicial Selection Method for State-
Wide Appellate Courts: Traditional Partisan Elections
Orientation to Pennsylvania’s current selection method for its ap-
pellate judiciary and the state’s political climate are vital prior to
any discussion of the proposed changes that the majority of this ar-
ticle will explore.47 It would be naïve to think that a conversation
about a change to judicial selection started without some unease
stemming from a lack of faith in judicial independence.48 There are
a number of manifestations of such unease, both in Pennsylvania
and across the United States; in Pennsylvania, a 2018 Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court decision, League of Women Voters of Pennsylva-
nia v. Commonwealth, appears to have rejuvenated discussions re-
garding judicial reform for Pennsylvania’s appellate courts.49
League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania concerned the constitu-
tionality of Pennsylvania’s congressional districts drawn following
the 2011 census.50 In this case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
determined that the challenged map was unconstitutionally gerry-
mandered, seven years after it was drawn.51 Following its decision
in League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has come under scrutiny by the public, the state leg-
islature, and lobbyists claiming that the decision was politically mo-
tivated.52 Additionally, there has been renewed concern, from both
46. Colquitt, supra note 3, at 74 (“[Judicial selection systems] should possess (at least)
three principle features: it should adhere to democratic ideals; it should maintain as much
independence as reasonably possible; and it should enjoy public acceptance and support.”).
47. See generally Schluckebier, supra note 10; Mark Scolforo, House Panel Advances
Changes in Pennsylvania Judge Elections, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (Apr. 30, 2019),
https://apnews.com/6eb05e080fc6417692ed59e2fe952794 (illustrating rivaling partisan sup-
port for House Bill 111 and House Bill 196).
48. Lindquist, supra note 43, at 63.
49. See League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 175 A.3d 282 (Pa. 2018).
50. Id. at 284.
51. Id.
52. See Folmer, supra note 7; Levy, supra note 12; Muschick, supra note 7. Some groups
even called for the impeachment of some Pennsylvania Justices, though, to no avail. See Sam
Levine, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Scolds His Own Party for Trying to Impeach Jus-
tices, HUFFPOST (Mar. 22, 2018, 4:31 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/pennsylvania-su-
preme-court-impeachment_n_5ab3ff9ee4b054d118e0e964. However, many Justices of West
Virginia’s Supreme Court were not so fortunate when recently confronted with the repercus-
sions of their less than judicial actions. See Townsend, supra note 23.
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Democrat and Republican lawmakers, regarding the role of the
Court in resolving inherently political issues such as election dis-
tricts.53
To be clear, League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania did not ini-
tiate conversations in Pennsylvania regarding the ideological and
political independence of the judiciary.54 In fact, Pennsylvania’s
General Assembly has previously proposed amendments to the
state constitution to alter the method of appellate judicial selec-
tion.55 Nonetheless, following League of Women Voters of Pennsyl-
vania, the Republican majority of Pennsylvania’s General Assem-
bly has demonstrated renewed motivation in advocacy to reassess
Pennsylvania’s appellate judicial selection process.56 Proposed
changes to the selection method may make it easier to select, not a
more politically independent, but rather a more “diverse” appellate
bench.57 In addition to perceived issues of political independence,
organizations and scholars have called for changes to Pennsylva-
nia’s appellate selection method due to the highly impactful role of
campaign finance in state judicial elections.58
Pennsylvania currently uses a partisan election process to select
its appellate judiciary, and all levels of the judiciary.59 Under this
process, the judicial candidates run in a primary election under a
party label, typically Republican or Democrat.60 The public vote in
partisan primaries and the candidate from each party with the
highest votes wins the nomination and represents that party in the
53. See Folmer, supra note 7 (opinion piece by Republican Senator Mike Folmer of Leb-
anon, Pennsylvania discussing the League of Women Voters’ case and related concerns re-
garding the appellate bench); Muschick, supra note 7 (detailing the bipartisan support of
House Bill 111 in an effort to secure a “fair, impartial and qualified judiciary”).
54. See, e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1903 (2016) (evaluating issue of
state supreme court Justice’s failure to recuse); Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC,
709 F.3d 240, 254 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing partiality of decisionmaker in arbitration con-
text); H.R. 111, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017).
55. Pa. H.R. 111.
56. According to some, the motivation behind the General Assembly’s renewed efforts to
alter Pennsylvania’s appellate judicial selection method is the “loss” that the Republican ma-
jority suffered in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in League of Women Voters. See
John Baer, The Legislature Is Again Courting Changes for Pa. Courts, PHILA. INQUIRER (May
14, 2019, 4:19 PM), https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/john-baer-courts-reform-diamond-leg-
islature-20190514.html; see also Levy, supra note 12; Scolforo, supra note 47.
57. Baer, supra note 56 (explaining that at least one major articulated motivator for
House Bill 196 is to create a more “diverse” bench).
58. See, e.g., Devins & Mansker, supra note 9, at 495 n.33 (alterations in original) (quot-
ing Justice Kennedy’s explanation that “[w]e weren’t talking about [money in judicial elec-
tions] [thirty] years ago because we didn’t have money in [judicial] elections. Money in elec-
tions presents us with a tremendous challenge . . . .”); Lindquist, supra note 43, at 66; Merit
Selection System, supra note 10.
59. Judicial Selection in Pennsylvania, supra note 13.
60. Partisan Election of Judges, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Partisan_elec-
tion_of_judges (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
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general election.61 The public then votes in the general election for
their desired judge or Justice.62 The judicial candidate with the
highest number of votes wins and serves a ten year term.63
After ten years, Pennsylvania’s appellate judges and Justices
must survive a “yes/no” retention election.64 By this process, the
public votes either “yes” or “no” for a judge or Justice to serve an-
other ten year term in their respective position.65 As occurs with
most election campaign processes, there is a large, arguably prob-
lematic, amount of spending in Pennsylvania’s judicial elections.66
However, campaign spending and political speech of judicial candi-
dates are limited and regulated by judicial rules of conduct and
court decisions.67
Concerns about judicial advocacy, specifically following League of
Women Voters of Pennsylvania, have manifested in the form of two
proposed amendments to the Pennsylvania Constitution: House
Bill 111 and House Bill 196.68 These proposed amendments would,
respectively, create a merit-based appointment system and sub-
stantially revise the process of partisan-judicial elections for the ap-
pellate judiciary.69 Because it is the “task [of] a good judicial selec-
tion system . . . not simply to fill vacancies, but to select the best
candidates for judicial positions,”70 the question is whether these
competing bills would actually be a step toward producing the “best”
judiciary or whether they are pure political posturing.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Judicial Selection in Pennsylvania, supra note 13.
64. Id.
65. Id. Although, the impact of judicial retention methods exceeds the scope of this arti-
cle, there are emerging studies that the retention method may have a significant impact on
the decisions and behavior of the bench. See Lindquist, supra note 43, at 108.
66. Lindquist, supra note 43, at 64; Baer, supra note 56; Schluckebier, supra note 10.
67. Lindquist, supra note 43, at 64; see Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002);
see also MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (the judiciary should
avoid actual or the appearance of impropriety).
68. H.R. 111, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019); H.R. 196, 2019 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019).
69. Pa. H.R. 111; Pa. H.R. 196. The process to amend Pennsylvania’s Constitution re-
quires that the resolution pass both houses, in two consecutive sessions. Benjamin Pontz,
Two for the Price of One: Pair of Proposed Amendments to State Constitution Head to Pa.
House, WITF (June 29, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://papost.org/2020/06/29/two-for-the-price-of-
one-pair-of-proposed-amendments-to-state-constitution-head-to-pa-house/. The amendment
must next be publicly advertised in newspapers in every county. Id. Ultimately, to be
adopted, it must succeed in a public vote to adopt that amendment. Id.
70. Colquitt, supra note 3, at 74.
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B. Proposed Changes to Appellate Judicial Selection in House
Bill 111: Merit-Based Appointment
During the 2019–2020 Session, the Pennsylvania House of Rep-
resentatives considered House Bill 111 for a second time.71 This
legislation would require an amendment to the state Constitution,
specifically to certain Sections in Article V of Pennsylvania’s Con-
stitution, and would establish a merit-based appointment system
for selecting the appellate judiciary.72 Notably, it does not appear
that House Bill 111 proposed any changes to the retention-election
system currently practiced for Pennsylvania’s state-wide appellate
courts.73 Although numerous changes would be made if this Bill
were to result in an amendment to Pennsylvania’s constitution, the
three most significant are: (1) the division of the state into three
regional districts;74 (2) the creation of the Appellate Court Nominat-
ing Commission;75 and (3) the modification of the procedure for fill-
ing vacancies on the appellate bench.76
1. Redistricting: Amended Section 11
First, House Bill 111 would amend Article V Section 11. This
amended section would authorize the General Assembly to estab-
lish, by law, three districts from which the appellate judiciary
would then be selected.77 Amended Section 11, would begin with a
provision articulating that each judge and Justice of the appellate
judiciary “shall provide every resident of this Commonwealth with
approximately equal representation on a court.”78 It further au-
thorizes the General Assembly to establish an Eastern, Middle, and
Western judicial district from which the appellate judiciary shall be
71. The General Assembly previously considered a version of House Bill 111 during the
2017–2018 Regular session that would have made similar changes to appellate judicial se-
lection by amending the state constitution. H.R. 111, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa.
2017). As of the submission of this article for publication, House Bill 111 failed to receive the
necessary support in the House of Representatives during the 2019–2020 Regular Session
and has died in chambers. H.R. 111, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019); Pennsylvania
House Bill 111, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/PA/bill/HB111/2019 (last visited Jan. 2,
2021). By contrast, and as will be discussed further, House Bill 196 has received the neces-
sary support during the 2019–2020 Regular Session to be considered again in the upcoming
session.
72. Id.
73. PA. CONST. art. V, § 15(b) (amended 2016).
74. Pa. H.R. 111, § 11(b)(1).
75. Pa. H.R. 111, § 14.
76. Pa. H.R. 111, § 13(b.1).
77. Pa. H.R. 111, § 11(b)(1).
78. Pa. H.R. 111, § 11(a).
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selected.79 Section 11(b)(1) consists of three subsections which es-
tablish the number of judges and Justices from each state-wide ap-
pellate court, the Supreme, Superior, and Commonwealth, to be se-
lected from these three judicial districts.80 Subsection I establishes
the state-wide distribution of the Pennsylvania’s seven Supreme
Court Justices.81 This subsection provides that two Justices will be
selected from each district; the seventh Justice will then be “se-
lected on a Statewide basis” and may be “a resident of any of the
judicial districts.”82 Subsection II describes the distribution of the
fifteen Superior Court judges.83 It requires that five judges be se-
lected from each of the three proposed judicial districts.84 Subsec-
tion III explains that the three of the nine Commonwealth Court
judges will be selected from each judicial district.85
The general provision applicable to the drawing of judicial dis-
tricts—that the “number and boundaries of judicial districts shall
be changed by the General Assembly only with the advice and con-
sent of the Supreme Court”—does not apply to amended Section
11.86 Instead, amended Section 11 states that “[t]he number of
Judges and Justices . . . from each judicial district shall provide
every resident of this Commonwealth with approximately equal
representation on a court. Each judicial district shall be composed
of compact and contiguous territory as nearly equal in population
as practicable.”87 These requirements look nearly identical to the
General Assembly’s requirements for drawing Congressional dis-
tricts.88 Section 11(c), further empowers the General Assembly to
establish the qualifications for appointment to the appellate judici-
ary.89 Amended Section 11 deviates from the current, statewide,
election process for the appellate judiciary by vesting in the General
Assembly the power to create districts from which the appellate ju-
diciary is to be selected.
79. Pa. H.R. 111, § 11(b)(1).
80. See Pa. H.R. 111, § 11(b)(1)(i)–(iii).
81. Pa. H.R. 111, § 11(b)(1)(i).
82. Id.
83. Pa. H.R. 111, § 11(b)(1)(ii).
84. Id.
85. Pa. H.R. 111, § 11(b)(1)(iii).
86. Compare PA. CONST. art. V, § 11 (1968) (emphasis added), with Pa. H.R. 111, § 11(a).
87. Pa. H.R. 111, § 11(a).
88. PA. CONST. art. II, § 16 (amended 1968) (requiring that legislative districts “shall be
composed of compact and contiguous territory as nearly equal in population as practicable”).
89. Pa. H.R. 111, § 11(c).
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2. Establishing the Committee: Amended Section 14
Amended Section 14 establishes the Appellate Court Nominating
Commission (ACNC).90 The ACNC, is to be “an independent board
within the Executive Department” consisting of thirteen mem-
bers.91 The thirteen members of the ACNC are appointed by the
Governor (five appointees), the Senate majority leader (two appoin-
tees), the Senate minority leader (two appointees), the House of
Representatives majority leader (two appointees), and the House of
Representatives minority leader (two appointees).92 The first
ACNCmembers will serve staggered terms; however, following this
first appointment, the ACNC members will serve four year terms.93
The members must be at least eighteen years old, be a resident of
Pennsylvania for at least one year prior to their appointment, and
maintain residency for the duration of their term.94 Members of the
ACNC may not hold political office, hold an elected or appointed
position, or be an employee of the state during their term.95 Mem-
bers are not to be compensated for their service, but they may re-
ceive reimbursement for expenses incurred in the course of their
official duties.96
Amended Section 14 also establishes the procedure by which the
ACNC will generate its list of judicial nominees.97 The ACNC is to
solicit applications and publicly announce that it is receiving appli-
cations from those interested in being considered.98 The General
Assembly is responsible for establishing a timeline for solicitation
of applications and the procedure by which the ACNC is to evaluate
potential nominees.99 The ACNC then selects five of the most qual-
ified applicants to be submitted to the Governor for consideration.100
When making this selection, the ACNC “may consider that the ap-
pellate courts reflect the racial, ethnic, gender and other diversity”
of Pennsylvania.101 The nominees submitted to the Governor by the
ACNC must meet the following criteria: be a Pennsylvania resident
for at least one year prior to submission of application, meet the
90. Pa. H.R. 111, § 14.
91. Pa. H.R. 111, § 14(d)–(d)(1).
92. Pa. H.R. 111, § 14(d)(1)(i)–(v).
93. Pa. H.R. 111, § 14(d)(2).
94. Id.
95. Pa. H.R. 111, § 14(d)(3).
96. Pa. H.R. 111, § 14(d)(5).




101. Id. (emphasis added).
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residency requirements set forth in 11(c), be a licensed member of
the Bar of the Supreme Court in good standing, and have “either
practiced law or been in a law-related occupation” for at least ten
years at the time of selection.102 In addition to these criteria, the
General Assembly may establish additional nomination procedures
for the ACNC and additional qualifications required for applicants
to be eligible for nomination.103 Section 14 is perhaps the most no-
ticeable change to the selection process because it creates the ACNC
which would have the responsibility, rather than the people, to se-
lect the appellate judiciary.
3. Filling Vacancies: Amended Section 13
Amended Section 13 establishes the process by which a vacancy
on the Supreme, Superior, or Commonwealth Court shall be
filled.104 This section requires that vacancies be filled by appoint-
ment based on a nomination by the Governor to the Senate.105 The
Governor is to make his nomination from the list of five nominees
provided to him from the ACNC.106 This section also establishes a
timeline and two-thirds majority requirement by which the Senate
may approve the Governor’s nomination. If two-thirds of the Senate
fails to act upon a nomination that was properly made by the Gov-
ernor under this section, then the nominee will “take office as if the
appointment had been consented to by the Senate.”107 Additionally,
if the Senate rejects the Governor’s nomination, he has the oppor-
tunity to make a substitute nomination, from the ACNC list, two
additional times.108 If the Governor’s nomination is rejected three
times, then the ACNC is empowered to appoint any other individual
on their list.109 Under this scenario, the ACNC’s appointee “take[s]
office upon notification of the appointment by the commission and
neither the Governor nor the Senate” plays any further role in the
appointment process for that vacancy.110
102. Pa. H.R. 111, § 14(h)(1)–(4).
103. Pa. H.R. 111, § 14(i).
104. Pa. H.R. 111, § 13(b.1)(1).
105. Pa. H.R. 111, § 13(b.1)(1).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Pa. H.R. 111, § 13(b.1)(2).
109. Id.
110. Id.
208 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 59
C. Proposed Changes to Appellate Judicial Selection in House
Bill 196: Partisan Election from “Regional Appellate Court
Districts”
House Bill 196 will, like its counterpart House Bill 111, require
an amendment to Pennsylvania’s Constitution.111 However, this
bill does not change the mechanism of judicial selection; the Penn-
sylvania appellate judiciary would still be elected in partisan elec-
tions.112 Instead, House Bill 196 would make two notable changes
to the Pennsylvania Constitution—again, largely in Section 11—
that would alter the organization of partisan judicial elections.113
Under House Bill 196, judicial elections would be conducted in
thirty-one newly created regional districts, each providing “approx-
imately equal representation,” as drawn by the General Assem-
bly.114
Under House Bill 196, the seven state Supreme Court Justices
would “be elected from seven judicial districts which shall be estab-
lished by law,”115 and the fifteen Superior Court judges would be
“elected from judicial districts which shall be established by law,”116
as would the nine Commonwealth Court judges.117 While the draw-
ing of election districts is not technically a new job for the General
Assembly, it is new in the context of state appellate judicial dis-
tricts.118 House Bill 196 would amend Section V of the state Con-
stitution to require that the number of judges and Justices “elected
from each judicial district shall provide every resident of the Com-
monwealth with approximately equal representation on a court.”119
111. See H.R. 196, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019).
112. Id. As of submission of this article for publication, House Bill 196 has received the
necessary support during the 2019–2020 Regular Session to be considered again in the up-
coming session by the General Assembly. Pennsylvania House Bill 196, LEGISCAN,
https://legiscan.com/PA/bill/HB196/2019 (last visited Jan. 2, 2021).
113. See Pa. H.R. 196.
114. Compare Pa. H.R. 196, § 11(a), with PA. CONST. art. V, § 11 (1968). See also Baer,
supra note 56 (“[T]he notion that judges are representative is a fairly new development. I
always ask why. And usually it’s part of a movement to form a more politically responsive
judiciary, . . . part of the new politics of judicial elections.”) (quoting Charles Gehy, an Indiana
University Law professor).
115. Pa. H.R. 196, § 2(b).
116. Pa. H.R. 196, § 3. Importantly, the current fifteen judge Superior Court could be
reduced or increased under amended Section 3 which states only that there “shall not be less
than seven judges . . . .” Id.
117. Pa. H.R. 196, § 4. There is no promise under House Bill 196 that the Commonwealth
Court will continue to consist of nine judges; the only requirement is that this court “consist
of the number of judges” and that those “number of judges” be elected from judicial districts
established by law. Id.
118. See PA. CONST. art. V, §§ 2–4 (1968) (articulating that the appellate courts are to be
“statewide”).
119. Pa. H.R. 196, § 11(a).
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One judge or Justice would be elected from each district.120 Addi-
tionally, this proposed amendment imparts on the General Assem-
bly the responsibility of drawing judicial districts that are “com-
posed of compact and contiguous territory as nearly equal in popu-
lation as practicable” and articulates that “no county, city, incorpo-
rated town, borough, township or ward may be divided” unless “ab-
solutely necessary.”121
Under House Bill 196, the creation of the judicial districts from
which the Justices of the Supreme Court and the judges of the Su-
perior and Commonwealth Court would be elected is the duty of the
Pennsylvania General Assembly.122 This is not the extent of the
General Assembly’s powers under House Bill 196’s proposed Sec-
tion 11(b).123 It would also be up to the General Assembly to: estab-
lish a transition into an appellate judiciary elected from judicial dis-
tricts; determine what effect districts will have on retention and re-
election; organize the order of each districts’ election for each court;
and “realign[] the appellate judicial districts based on the Federal
decennial census . . . .”124 Notably, subsection (c) of House Bill 196’s
proposed Section 11 states: “Except as provided under subsection (b)
. . ., the number and boundaries of all other judicial districts shall
be established by the General Assembly by law, with the advice and
consent of the Supreme Court.”125
House Bill 111 and House Bill 196 represent rivaling public calls
for judicial legitimacy.126 One represents the belief that removing
judicial selection from the inherently political process of elections
and placing it into the hands of a committee, hand selected by an
elected Governor, will produce a more independent judiciary.127
The other would allegedly produce a more representative bench
than already produced by a state-wide election by dividing the state
into districts by which individuals in each district would elect only
one state Supreme Court Justice, one Superior Court judge, and one
Commonwealth Court judge.128 Importantly, House Bill 196 would
120. Id.
121. Id. (closely resembling the Pennsylvania Constitution’s requirements for drawing
Congressional districts but excepting the judicial districts drawn under Section 11(b) from
receiving the advice and consent of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
122. Pa. H.R. 196, § 11(b)(1).
123. See Pa. H.R. 196, § 11(b).
124. Pa. H.R. 196, § 11(b)(2)–(5).
125. Pa. H.R. 196, § 11(c) (emphasis added). Significantly, this amendment eliminates
the General Assembly’s previously required receipt of advice and consent from the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court when creating the new, regional electoral districts.
126. H.R. 111, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019); Pa. H.R. 196.
127. Pa. H.R. 111.
128. Pa. H.R. 196.
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only change the way in which judicial selection would be conducted,
it does not change the manner in which these elections would oc-
cur.129 House Bill 196 would still allow for partisan elections, with
which the public is familiar.130 Thus, it is unsurprising that House
Bill 196 is progressing more quickly and with stronger support from
the General Assembly than House Bill 111, in its current or prior
formulation, has progressed.131 The subsequent sections set forth
four factors to consider when considering the impact that these pro-
posed methods may have on the legitimacy of Pennsylvania’s appel-
late bench.
III. PROPOSED RULE: FOUR FACTORS TODETERMINE A “BEST”
SELECTIONMETHOD
The ideal judiciary results from the ideal selection method. This
sounds simple—use the best selection method, get the best judges.
If only things were so simple.132 There are countless articles dis-
cussing elected versus appointed judicial selection and the unique
judicial selection procedures of each state, which indicate selecting
the ideal judiciary is far from a simple task.133 In reality, this arti-
cle posits that the goal of any selection method should be to main-
tain the legitimacy of the bench and instill faith in the judicial pro-
cess. Accordingly, the “best” selection must promote public percep-
tion of legitimacy on the bench.134 The relationship between the
judiciary and the public is a cyclical relationship.135 If the public
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Compare Pa. H.R. 111 (reforming state-wide, partisan election system to regional,
merit-based appointment), with Pa. H.R. 196 (reforming state-wide, partisan election system
to regional, partisan elections). An alternative rationale for the progression of House Bill
196 is its partisan support from the Republican legislators that currently hold a majority of
seats in the state House of Representatives and Senate. Pennsylvania General Assembly,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania_General_Assembly (last visited, Jan. 2,
2021).
132. Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for
an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 290 (2010) (addressing
the difficulties in quantifying a “best” selection method and applying three measures of judi-
cial quality: productivity, citations, and independence to compare appointed and elected
methods); Johnsen, supra note 3, at 831 (“The qualities of a good judge are easy to name but
sometimes difficult to discern and almost always impossible to quantify: intelligence, integ-
rity, fairness, diligence, experience, judgement, perspective, compassion.”).
133. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 132; Johnsen, supra note 3, at 846 (analyzing diver-
sity, or lack thereof, of state judiciary based on judicial selection method). See generally
Colquitt, supra note 3 (addressing the importance of selecting a competent and effective ju-
dicial selection commission and the difficulties that accompany a failure to do otherwise).
134. Lindquist, supra note 43, at 67–68.
135. Id. at 66.
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lacks faith in the judiciary, then the judiciary loses its credibility.136
And when the judiciary lacks credibility, the law and the public suf-
fer.137
Certain general qualifications and qualities are desired in and
expected from the appellate judiciary.138 Judges are expected to de-
cide cases based on law, not emotions.139 The public desires judges
who follow the policy goals and purposes of the law as articulated
by the legislature, not those who act on impulse.140 Judges are ex-
pected not to be so influenced by a whim or personal passion that
they overrule important precedent.141 Judges who strive for con-
sistency and predictability of the law, while realizing that, in cer-
tain circumstances, justice and fundamental rights require expe-
dited action that only the court can provide, are desirable.142 The
ideal appellate judiciary is made up of judges with certain charac-
teristics so that these goals may be achieved.143 Thus, it is equally
important when determining what judicial selection method is
“best” that the General Assembly and the public do not act out of
passion or a reactive impulse.144
It is first necessary to determine what the ideal judiciary looks
like, then consider which of the various selection methods will have
the greatest potential to meet the goal of producing a judiciary that
the public finds legitimate and credible. To best analyze what it
takes to produce a judiciary in which the public has faith,145 this
article articulates a four-factor test by which judicial selection
methods may be analyzed for their potential to produce the public
perception of legitimacy. These four categories include: (1)
136. Id. at 67.
137. Id.; see also Maggie Jo Buchanan & Abbey Meller, Brett Kavanaugh: A Representa-
tion of Damaged U.S. Judiciary, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 1, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/news/2019/10/01/475181/brett-kavanaugh-
representation-damaged-u-s-judiciary/.
138. Colquitt, supra note 3, at 78 (noting that democratic ideals, independence, and public
support are vital to any judicial nomination); Newman & Isaacs, supra note 5, at 1 (“T[he]
effective functioning of the dispute resolution process in our society requires an independent
and accountable judiciary.”); Lindquist, supra note 43, at 62, 67.
139. See Lindquist, supra note 43, at 62, 67.
140. Id. at 67.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Colquitt, supra note 3, at 77 78 (positing that the goals of democratic ideals of
political independence and public support may be served through judicial nomination); New-
man & Isaacs, supra note 5, 10–11, 13–14 (considering the weight placed on accountability
or independence depending on favored selection method).
144. Scolforo, supra note 47 (illustrating the potential political motivation behind House
Bill 111 and 196).
145. See generally Devins & Mansker, supra note 9 (addressing the importance of public
opinion and public support of a judiciary regardless of selection method).
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demographic diversity, (2) communicative competency, (3) ideologi-
cal independence, and (4) education and experience.
A. Demographic Diversity
Demographic diversity requires consideration of certain socio-
economic qualities of the judge-to-be, including, but not limited to,
their education, residency status, experience in the legal practice,
and years admitted to the Pennsylvania bar.146 Also in this cate-
gory are certain personal qualities such as race, gender, identity,
ethnicity, age, and religion.147 The qualities listed here are by no
means an exhaustive collection of those that make judges diverse.
This factor contains certain quantifiable traits by which the public
is able to perceive the otherwise often isolated judiciary.148 The pur-
pose of this factor is to bring into consideration the fact that the
general public and legal community seek not only a qualified judi-
ciary, but also one with which they can identify.149 The public and
the legal community want to be able to see a judiciary that looks
like them, or at the very least does not all look the same, as well as
one that is educated, experienced, and well-versed in the legal at-
mosphere in which they practice.150
B. Communicative Competency
Communicative competency includes attributes such as an abil-
ity to be collegial with those of differing opinions, general commu-
nication skills, and willingness to cooperate with others.151 Simply
put, it is important for judges and Justices, especially those at the
appellate level, to communicate with each other effectively so that
146. Johnsen, supra note 3, at 833 (introducing the broad range of objectively diverse at-
tributes that a bench should possess).
147. Although diversity is consistently desired, many legal scholars have found conflicting
or inconclusive evidence that a certain selection method will produce diversity on the bench.
See, e.g., Lindquist, supra note 43, at 77 78, 80.
148. See Harry T. Edwards, Required Reading; Judicial Isolation, N.Y. TIMES (July 16,
1984), https://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/16/us/required-reading-judicial-isolation.html (de-
scribing, from the perspective of a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, the isolation that accompanies the judiciary).
149. See generally Devins & Mansker, supra note 9.
150. See generally Johnsen, supra note 3.
151. SeeMelissa M. Berry et al.,Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst
the Cacophony of Concurrences, and Re-Percolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y& L.
299, 350 53 (2008) (discussing the importance of majority in presenting a cohesive bench);
see also Edwards, supra note 148.
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they produce durable and consistent opinions.152 In order to create
opinions with the highest precedential value, it is best to have as
many Justices in the majority as possible.153 This requires a great
deal of communication and sometimes compromise, but the integ-
rity of the law and trust in the Court require no less.154 Being a
judge can be an isolating career, and the public and legal commu-
nity benefit from a judiciary that can overcome this while maintain-
ing its duty to uphold the law.155
C. Ideological Independence
Ideological independence is not as easily explained in concrete
qualities as the other factors. Rather, ideological independence is
largely a quality constructed by the public’s desire for impartial,
accountable, and protective judges and Justices.156 Ideological in-
dependence is quite possibly the most important factor of this test;
however, it is the hardest to identify in a judge prior to selection.157
Rather, this quality is seen through practice and continued dedica-
tion to decide controversies, even those which may upset the public,
based on an impartial process that is grounded in and faithful to
the law.158 It is a true test of a judge or Justices’ reputation if she
can publish a decision on a hotly contested, and possibly divisive,
issue and maintain a reputation of impartiality and legitimacy in
the eye of the public.
D. Education and Experience
The ideal judicial candidate should have a certain degree of expe-
rience or accomplishment that may come from their education or
152. See Berry et al., supra note 151, at 350–53 (explaining that the goals of certainty and
predictability are not supported where a judge or Justice’s concurrence is motivated to create
a disproportionate influence; instead, a “true majority” is preferable).
153. Id. at 300 (“Conflicts created by concurrences and pluralities in court decisions may
be the epitome of confusion in law and lower court interpretation.”).
154. Id. at 350–53; see also Edwards, supra note 148.
155. See Edwards, supra note 148.
156. See, e.g., Newman & Isaacs, supra note 5, at 4 (expressing that no matter the selec-
tion method, the goal is to create a judiciary that is independent from political interference,
accountable to the public, and concerned with protecting individual’s rights).
157. Devins & Mansker, supra note 9, at 473 (addressing the conflict that arises between
the human desire to be liked and supported with the presumed need of an independent judi-
ciary); Johnsen, supra note 3, at 837 (“At the very least, the perception of [a judge] is tar-
nished when the public believes judges may be influenced by campaign donors who helped
put them on the bench.”).
158. See generally Devins & Mansker, supra note 9.
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professional experiences after obtaining their law degree.159 The
degree of experience may vary and may come from a number of
paths that the candidate has chosen to pursue. This experience
could be from years as a judge at the trial court level or expertise in
a particular area or industry of legal practice.160 It could similarly
originate from a unique or notable educational environment or a
professional experience that occurred prior to obtaining a law de-
gree.161
IV. APPLICATION: FOUR FACTORS, TWO BILLS, ONE “BEST”
METHOD[?]
Each factor in this test is designed to address the goal of legiti-
macy on the bench and to consider whether the legislative response
to alleged politicization of the judiciary may do more harm than
good in addressing this goal.162 In the following two sections, these
four factors are applied to the proposed methods of judicial selection
to consider whether they may be successful in generating a public
perception of judicial legitimacy. The goal in doing so is to identify
the strongest and weakest attributes of each proposed selection
method and to determine if these proposed amendments fall short
of generating legitimacy by serving a particular political agenda.
A. House Bill 111
As previously explained, House Bill 111 proposes a state consti-
tutional amendment that would change the selection method from
state-wide partisan elections to a merit-based appointment process
for the selection of Pennsylvania’s Superior, Commonwealth, and
Supreme Courts.163 House Bill 111 is a reincarnation of a 2017–
2018 Bill proposing the same amendment to change the selection
159. Johnsen, supra note 3, at 833 34 (indicating that in addition to diversity and other
non-quantifiable qualities, there are “objective credentials such as judicial clerkships and
attendance at ranked universities and law schools” that support a desirable and broad col-
lection of perspectives on the bench).
160. Id. at 833.
161. An analysis of the rank of the institution from which a candidate obtained her legal
education is of minimal importance in order to avoid crafting an elitist bench or a bench that
values educational institution over diversity or experience or quality of the judge. Cf. John-
sen, supra note 3, at 840–42 (indicating concern that appointment “tends to reinforce elitist,
majoritarian, and establishment decision-making” by disadvantaging “women, minorities,
and those with non-traditional legal backgrounds”).
162. See Devins & Mansker, supra note 9, at 475 76 (addressing the innate fact that state
appellate courts are more exposed to politics than lower courts, especially when selected un-
der a popular election method); see also Levy, supra note 12 (calling regional judicial districts
a “scheme to Gerrymander the courts”).
163. H.R. 111, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019).
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method for Pennsylvania’s three appellate courts.164 Although
House Bill 111 had previously died for want of support, this re-
newed, bi-partisan effort to restore public perception of legitimacy
in Pennsylvania’s appellate courts initially showed potential to
bring about a new result.165 Nonetheless, this resuscitated House
Bill 111 similarly died in chambers during the 2019–2020 Regular
Session for failure to garner necessary support in the House.166
House Bill 111 did not progress for further consideration despite
the belief, shared by many legal scholars and advocacy groups,167
that the appointment method is superior to elections insofar as it
pertains to producing public feelings of legitimacy in the judici-
ary.168 Despite the death of House Bill 111, the following four-factor
examination provides insight into the impact that the potential, or
future, adoption of a merit-based appointment method may have on
the public’s perception of legitimacy in Pennsylvania’s appellate ju-
diciary.
First, demographic diversity, under the merit-based appointment
method, is entirely at the hands of the ACNC.169 The ACNC has
complete discretion, with some small legislative limitations for
things like residency and prior employment, to nominate candi-
dates.170 With this discretion comes great responsibility, and the
public and legal community are essentially putting their faith in the
hands of a middleman (or woman) to select candidates who are not
only diverse in education and experience, but also diverse in terms
of race, gender, sexual orientation, physical ability, and religion.171
While it would be nice to assume that the ACNC would always con-
sider demographic diversity when selecting a candidate to nomi-
nate, that assumption is not entirely supported by the experience
164. H.R. 111, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017), 2017 Bill Text PA H.B. 111
(LEXIS).
165. See League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 175 A.3d 282, 294 (Pa. 2018);
Folmer, supra note 7; Muschick, supra note 7.
166. Pennsylvania House Bill 111, supra note 71.
167. See generally Colquitt, supra note 3, at 74 (expressing the ideal nominating commis-
sion and support for appointed judiciary); Merit Selection System, supra note 10 (strongly
supporting a merit-based appointment system of judicial selection).
168. Although this article will not explore them further, there are two reasons that come
to mind as to why House Bill 111, and other efforts to shift to judicial selection by appoint-
ment, have continued to lack momentum in Pennsylvania: (i) a fear of too drastic a change
that may result from abandoning judicial selection by election and (ii) lack of support from
the Republican majority of Pennsylvania’s General Assembly.
169. H.R. 111, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 14(h) (Pa. 2019) (Under H.B. 111, the
ACNC “may consider that the appellate courts reflect the racial, ethnic, gender and other
diversity . . . .”) (emphasis added).
170. See id.
171. See Johnsen, supra note 3, at 833 34.
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of other states that have made the switch to nominating commit-
tees.172
Next, communicative competency may not be facially addressed
under merit-based appointment.173 However, because the members
of the ACNC would be both members of the legal community and
public, there is an opportunity to select candidates who have a rep-
utation for collegiality and a willingness to communicate.174 This
factor could be well addressed by the ACNC in interviews and in
considering applications for nomination. For purposes of this con-
versation, it may be assumed that the ACNC would properly place
value on these qualities; meaning, at least in theory, that commu-
nicative competency would be well accounted for when the ACNC is
selecting candidates.
Further, as to ideological independence, it has been proffered that
such independence is secured by the diluted politics of an appoint-
ment selection system.175 By contrast, these back-room politics—to
create the ACNC, for the Governor to select a specific nominee, and
for the Senate to actually approve that nomination—may further
separate the public from the judiciary.176 Although the ACNC could
virtually eliminate issues of election finance, it may not be as effec-
tive at eliminating political influence as is argued.177 One can easily
imagine a scenario in which a member of the ACNC is selected be-
cause of a relationship or reputation of supporting a certain ideo-
logical agenda; or, where the Senate refuses to confirm the Gover-
nor’s selected candidate based on diverging political or personal be-
liefs. In such circumstances, the political games that exist in an
election would still exist, but now, rather than in plain view for pub-
lic consideration prior to election, the politics would be removed
from the public’s plain view. It is this “behind-the-scenes” politics
which could raise even deeper problems of ideological independence
172. Id. at 840 41; see also Judicial Selection in the States, supra note 24 (illustrating
that twenty-eight states select state supreme court Justices through some form of appoint-
ment).
173. See Pa. H.R. 111, § 14(h) (remaining silent about specific communicative skills that
nominees must have).
174. See id. (indicating through silence that ACNC has discretion to consider communica-
tive competency and other factors when selecting candidates).
175. See, e.g., Colquitt, supra note 3, at 90; Schluckebier, supra note 10; Merit Selection
System, supra note 10.
176. See Johnsen, supra note 3, at 841 42 (indicating that politics and elitist concerns still
exist despite the less public manifestations where there is an appointment rather than elec-
tion method); Muschick, supra note 7.
177. SeeMuschick, supra note 7.
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than are presently perceived to exist in Pennsylvania’s partisan
election process.178
Nonetheless, moving politics out of the direct public attention
could at least have the potential to reduce the perception that a
judge is acting as an arm for a certain political agenda, which may
lessen the bite of allegations of judicial advocacy. There are a num-
ber of states that have adopted merit-based appointment systems
with great success.179 Not to mention the fact that the United
States Supreme Court is selected through appointment, albeit a dif-
ferent appointment method.180 So, even though there is the poten-
tial that merit-based appointment would only reduce politically mo-
tivated decisions by way of appearance, there is support for the idea
that appointed judges are more ideologically independent since they
are not as interested in appealing to a Republican or Democrat
voter populous.181 Moreover, there is not much support to the idea
that, under merit-based appointment, a given judge would fall sub-
ject to the whim of a single political figure, such as the governor,
because subsequent retention remains in the hands of the public
though a “yes/no” election.182
Finally, as to education and experience, the application process
for candidates will allow the ACNC to filter out or more carefully
consider those applicants whose past experiences could spark con-
cern as to independence, such as prior political or governmental po-
sitions.183 The fact that the ACNC acts as a middleman (or woman)
is extremely helpful when it comes to considering a candidate’s ed-
ucation and experience. It is particularly helpful in eliminating the
ethical issues that stem from a reputational mudslinging campaign
or those that may arise if any troublesome relationships arise after
election.184
178. See, e.g., Colquitt, supra note 3, at 109 (“Making [judicial] selection invisible . . . muf-
fles conflict, avoids widespread competition, and strengthens the hands of political elites.”);
McKoski, supra note 8, at 289 90 (explaining that judicial transparency is preferred over a
potentially problematic “ignorance is bliss” theory of judicial ethics which provides those with
semi-private access to judges an advantage of those less with less judicial connections); Tim-
mer, supra note 32, at 45 (articulating that “[a]lmost all the political weight is behind the
scenes in the appointment selection process”).
179. Judicial Selection in the States, supra note 24 (as of the submission of this article
twenty-eight states select state supreme court Justices through either merit plan or guber-
natorial appointment).
180. BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44235, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT
PROCESS: PRESIDENT’S SELECTION OF ANOMINEE (2020).
181. Johnsen, supra note 3, at 837 (articulating the perspective that elected judges may
feel obliged to appease or be improperly influenced by their campaign donors).
182. Id. at 838 (explaining that the governor’s role in the appointment process is mitigated
by the vetting process of independent nominating commission).
183. Id. at 839.
184. Id. at 837.
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Inevitably, the ACNC would not entirely eliminate any and all
future allegations of less than ethical judicial conduct. Nonethe-
less, the ACNC, through its interview and consideration of potential
nominees, could act as a filter to reduce the number of claims of
impropriety that impact the public’s perception of judicial legiti-
macy.185 If used wisely, the interview process has the potential to
uncover any existing relationships or prior occupations that could
give rise to calls to recuse or allegations of impropriety. It would be
the individuals who make up the ACNC that ultimately impact the
ability for a judiciary to meet some or all of the factors that would
lead to the ideal bench.186 Accordingly, the efficacy of merit-based
selection in selecting an appellate judiciary that the public per-
ceives as legitimate is dependent on the ability of the General As-
sembly and Governor to work together and select an effective
ACNC. Perhaps, this dependence explains Pennsylvania’s two re-
cent and unsuccessful attempts to change to merit-based selection
method.187
B. House Bill 196
The amendment proposed by House Bill 196 is designed to create
a judiciary that represents individual regions across the state.188
The idea is that, when each region comes together on the bench, the
ideological and demographic diversity seen across Pennsylvania
would, likewise, be represented on the bench.189 Support for 196
necessitates a belief that the judiciary should be representative of
the people and their regional ideologies.
When it comes to demographic diversity, one would think that
House Bill 196, with its goal of “equal representation” and local elec-
tions, flawlessly fulfills this factor.190 However, as with any judicial
selection method, a supposed strength should be thoroughly consid-
ered in order to determine whether, in practice, the method would
live up to expectations. Lawmakers supporting House Bill 196, who
are generally Republican, argue that judicial districts will “add a
185. See H.R. 111, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 14(h) (Pa. 2019).
186. See Colquitt, supra note 3, at 86 (discussing the goals for and importance of the
makeup of a nominating commission).
187. See H.R. 111 (Pa. 2019); H.R. 111 (Pa. 2017).
188. See generally H.R. 196, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019); Baer, supra note
56.
189. Baer, supra note 56.
190. Id. (quoting primary sponsor of H.B. 196, Rep. Russ Diamond, explaining that the
goal of regional districts is “diversity of judicial opinion”).
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mix of regional representation to the high courts.”191 By contrast,
those in opposition of House Bill 196, generally Democratic law-
makers, claim that the amendment effectuated by House Bill 196 is
retaliation based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s controver-
sial decision, League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, in 2018.192
Although the political motivation behind House Bill 196 is more
overt than House Bill 111, in this apparent battle to reform Penn-
sylvania’s appellate judiciary, there remains substantial support
for the proposal based on the demographic diversity that smaller
regional districts could generate.193
Primary sponsor for House Bill 196, Representative Russ Dia-
mond of Lancaster, claims that the amendment would bring demo-
graphic and racial diversity to the courts.194 The rationale used is
that smaller, regional races provide a greater opportunity to elect
candidates who might otherwise get lost in state-wide elections.195
The idea is that the judges elected from these regions would better
represent the various ideological, experiential, and racial groups
that exist in different parts of the state.196 One reason for the sup-
port of House Bill 196, apart from the alleged judicial advocacy per-
ceived in League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, is the idea that
appellate courts with state-wide jurisdiction should represent the
entire state, not just the population centers of Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh.197 Although the motives of Republican lawmakers
sponsoring this bill may be less than altruistic, as there are a mi-
nority of judges and Justices identifying as politically Republican
on Pennsylvania’s appellate bench, there is legitimacy to the argu-
ment that public support for the judiciary may be more attainable
191. Stephen Caruso, How Pa.’s Supreme Court Moved Left, and What It Means for the
GOP, PHILA. TRIB. (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.phillytrib.com/news/state_and_region/how-
pa-s-supreme-court-moved-left-and-what-it/article_2d0bb4cf-2be1-5ab6-9a7f-f60ee242e3a3.
html.
192. See Baer, supra note 56 (“[O]ne might wonder if [House Bill 196] is real reform—or
old-fashioned retaliation for the 2018 judicial smackdown of the GOP legislature.”).
193. Levy, supra note 12 (indicating the largely partisan support from a majority of Penn-
sylvania’s House of Representatives which have now passed House Bill 196 onto the state
Senate for consideration).
194. See Caruso, supra note 191; Scolforo, supra note 47.
195. See Caruso, supra note 191; Scolforo, supra note 47.
196. See Caruso, supra note 191; Scolforo, supra note 47.
197. Caruso, supra note 191; see also Levy, supra note 12 (indicating that, of the five dem-
ocratic Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justices, one is a Philadelphia native and four are Pitts-
burgh natives); Schluckebier, supra note 10 (indicating an unprecedented $15.8 million was
spent on Pennsylvania’s last Supreme Court election campaigns).
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if the court looks like and thinks like Pennsylvania’s diverse citi-
zenry.198
On its face, House Bill 196 does not appear to account for com-
municative competency. Rather, there may be difficulty when those
elected from the various districts come together since voters
statewide have not come together to select the bench.199 There is
the potential that it will be the loudest voice from each district that
is elected. With loud voices and, importantly, loud voices from ar-
eas that have previously not felt heard, these voices may try to
make an impact without considering the long-term consequences.200
It can be said this is a necessary evil in the pursuit of a more repre-
sentative bench. Nonetheless, that pursuit inherently requires one
to believe that the judiciary should be representative. It is im-
portant to recognize however that, to legitimize the bench, the peo-
ple want a bench that can communicate and decide cases based on
precedent despite varying political objectives.201 The public and the
bar find more value in cases that are decided by the bench as a
whole, not segmented decisions.202 Thus, it is difficult to reconcile
how dividing the state into thirty-one judicial districts will provide
a more unified bench.
House Bill 196 also runs into trouble when considering ideologi-
cal independence. Pennsylvania’s appellate bench has the potential
to lose some legitimacy in the eyes of the legal community and
statewide public due to the divisive effect of regional districts.203
There are always arguments that the courts should not act as the
legislature,204 but House Bill 196 may have the effect of treating the
198. See Johnsen, supra note 3, at 833 34 (“Diverse perspectives, knowledge and life ex-
perience promote a more robust exchange among the members of an appellate panel. . . .
[D]iversity also enhances and widens public respect for the courts.”).
199. SeeH.R. 196, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 11(a) (Pa. 2019).
200. SeeNewman & Isaacs, supra note 5, at 15 (“Voters are said to be influenced by factors
having nothing to do with a candidate’s ability to perform the duties of a qualified justice or
judge, such as: party affiliation, name recognition, geographical location and ethnicity.”).
201. Berry et al., supra note 151, at 311 (“[J]udicial institutions should be guided by prec-
edent in order to foster a rule of law.”).
202. Id. at 313 14.
203. In fact, in early 2020, at least one county bar association in Pennsylvania has peti-
tioned to the state legislature in opposition of the impact that House Bill 196 could have on
the independence and legitimacy of the appellate judiciary. See E-mail from Lori E. McMas-
ter, Ass’n Pres., Allegheny Cnty. Bar Ass’n, to Hon. John Disanto, Chair, Senate State Gov’t
Comm. (Mar. 5, 2020). But see Russ Diamond, The Case for Regional Appellate Court Dis-
tricts in Support of House Bill 196: A 50-Year Review of Individuals Serving on Pennsylva-
nia’s Supreme, Superior, and Commonwealth Courts, PA. HOUSE REPUBLICAN CAUCUS,
http://www.repdiamond.com/Display/SiteFiles/171/OtherDocuments/Misc/HouseBill196and
theCaseforRegionalAppellateCourtDistricts.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
204. See McKoski, supra note 8, at 309 (discussing legislation that followed an Iowa Su-
preme Court decision which would reduce Justices’ salaries to the General Assembly salary:
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judiciary as a legislative vehicle. Under House Bill 196, district
maps would be drawn and partisan elections would occur just as it
is done to select the General Assembly.205 The only difference would
be the role of the judiciary; i.e., interpreting laws rather than cre-
ating them.206 The appellate judiciary, under House Bill 196, has
the potential to become a second legislative body that is equally, if
not more, concerned about reelection than the General Assembly
based on the role of the judiciary in interpreting and resolving con-
troversial legal issues. Accordingly, House Bill 196 may amplify,
not remedy, issues of perceived impropriety where the public ques-
tions a judges’ ability to fairly determine a controversial issue for
fear of a decision negatively affecting their position.207
In July 2020, the Pennsylvania House and Senate officially
signed off in support of House Bill 196.208 This is a major step to-
ward changing the process by which Pennsylvania’s appellate
courts are selected.209 While this support has caught the public’s
attention, and despite some concern about the proposed changes, it
will be a waiting game to see whether House Bill 196 maintains
support from the legislature for a second consecutive term.210 Based
on the above analysis of House Bill 196, a plan to create regional
judicial districts has the potential to create a political and ideologi-
cal divide that ultimately would not serve the statewide audience
that the appellate courts are intended to represent. Likewise,
House Bill 111 has its flaws under the above four-factor scrutiny
and could be viewed as a pendulum swing away from Pennsylva-
nia’s current method of partisan judicial elections.
Accordingly, as this four-factor consideration has indicated, per-
haps there is no perfect judicial selection method, and what is “best”
changes depending on the public’s perception of judicial legitimacy
at a given time. That being said, this analysis also illustrates that
any change to judicial selection must not be made in haste or pur-
suant to a political agenda. These two legislative proposals, House
Bill 111 and House Bill 196, are legislative responses to feelings of
“[I]f the Supreme Court wants to act like legislators they need to start getting paid like leg-
islators.”).
205. See H.R. 196, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019).
206. See id.
207. See, e.g., McKoski, supra note 8, at 308 (illustrating state legislative attempts to in-
terfere with judicial selection and function following court decisions that are unpopular with
the legislature); Newman & Isaacs, supra note 5, at 15 (expressing concern that “justices and
judges will feel obligated to the political leaders who select them and those who contribute to
their campaign funds”).
208. See Pennsylvania House Bill 196, supra note 112.
209. See id.
210. Levy, supra note 12.
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public unrest. Ultimately, it will become the responsibility of the
public to carefully consider whether these major changes to the se-
lection of Pennsylvania’s appellate judiciary would actually allow
them to perceive the judiciary as more legitimate.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite what appears to be a sense of renewed urgency from the
public, the bar, and the General Assembly, to achieve judicial fair-
ness and improve perceptions of judicial legitimacy, it is important
that the legislature does not act solely out of passion or politics
when it comes to judicial reform. Just as an impulsive judiciary is
undesirable, so too is an impulsive legislature. The state should
take measured steps to achieve the four, largely universal, expecta-
tions of the judiciary discussed above. The judicial branch does not
exist in a bubble. As the political climate in Pennsylvania, and the
United States as a whole, continues to polarize, judges are im-
pacted. This impact is not fully realized, however, until the public
believes there is an issue and loses faith in the legitimacy of the
judicial system. In the wake of recent decisions made by the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania, specifically League of Women Voters
of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania legislature appears to have re-
alized a lack of support and faith in the judiciary from some mem-
bers of the public as evidenced by these dueling proposals to revise
Pennsylvania’s method of judicial selection.211 Perhaps ironically
unique to states like Pennsylvania that conduct state-wide elections
to select their appellate judiciary, the same public that takes issue
with decisions like League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania or al-
leges judicial advocacy is the very public that has chosen the
bench.212 Likewise, it is the responsibility of the public, if these pro-
posed amendments or similar legislation continue to progress, to
become educated and vote for the adoption or rejection of state con-
stitutional amendments.213 Accordingly, the legal community and
211. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 175 A.3d 282 (Pa. 2018); see Folmer,
supra note 7; see alsoMuschick, supra note 7.
212. Lindquist, supra note 43, at 68.
213. As of October 2020, House Bill 196 has gained substantially more legislative momen-
tum than House Bill 111, which died in chambers while under consideration by the Pennsyl-
vania House of Representatives. Compare Pennsylvania House Bill 196, supra note 112,with
Pennsylvania House Bill 111, supra note 71. In order to adopt House Bill 196, or make any
amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Bill must maintain this momentum for
another, consecutive, legislative session and then be affirmed by a majority public vote. See
Pontz, supra note 69; see also John Finnerty, State Senate OKs Possible Constitution
Changes, DAILY ITEM (July 16, 2020), https://www.dailyitem.com/news/state-senate-oks-pos-
sible-constitution-changes/article_46c39b56-9c8c-540d-ab7c-94e12ac7ba0b.html.
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the public should hope and expect that Pennsylvania’s Legislature
carefully crafts proposed amendments and, if the time comes, that
the public thoroughly consider whether a particular change to judi-
cial selection method will truly further their faith in the legitimacy
and trustworthiness of the appellate bench.
